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Abstract 
 
The concept of globalization refers to a multitude of processes rapidly changing the space in which 
individuals, institutions, and systems interact with one another. Popular interpretations have seen 
increasing interconnectedness as the beginning of a “race to the bottom” in which the state is precluded 
from governance as a competition to attract capital and prevent flight mandates a retrenchment of the public 
sector. As this occurs, outside influences should crowd out opportunities for the “collective priority and 
preference setting” that defines democratic governance. Instead, much of the the convergence toward 
retrenchment has been endogenous change motivated by ideas and political strategy rather than exogenous 
economic pressure. America’s protracted battle over the debt ceiling provides a compelling case to explore 
how the ideational force of globalization has included new voices in domestic preference setting and 
augmented rather than crowded out public deliberation. Tracking the impact of these influences on the 
American discourse will help us understand how the 2012 elections are likely to be impacted by the 
emergence of groups willing and able to compete with the Republican Party on behalf of economic 
conservatives..  
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 “Governance is a game that many people and 
organizations get to play.” - B. Guy Peters 
 
“Compromises led us into this mess, and you can’t 
compromise your way out of it.” - Rep. Tom Graves, R-
GA 
 
The concept of globalization has come to refer 
to a multitude of processes rapidly changing the space 
in which individuals, institutions, and systems interact 
with one another. Popular interpretations have seen 
increasing interconnectedness as the beginning of a 
‘race to the bottom’ in which the state is precluded from 
governance as competition to attract capital and prevent 
flight mandates a retrenchment of the public sector. As 
this occurs, outside influences should crowd out 
opportunities for the “collective priority and preference 
setting” which defines democratic governance.1 Instead, 
much of the convergence toward retrenchment has been 
endogenous change motivated by ideas and political 
strategy rather than exogenous economic pressure.
2
 
America’s protracted battle over the debt ceiling 
provides a compelling case to explore how the 
ideational force of globalization has included new 
voices in domestic preference setting and augmented 
rather than crowded out public deliberation. Tracking 
the impact of these influences on the American 
discourse will help us understand what this could mean 
for the 2012 elections. 
America’s Changing Ideational Setting 
In December 2008, the public was divided 
over the appropriate role of government and the rising 
public debt was almost absent from the national 
discussion (about 3 percent of the public mentioned it 
as a top priority).
3
 At the time, the Obama stimulus 
enjoyed the support of 56 percent of the American 
public. As CNN Polling Director Keating Holland 
observed, “with the economy in such poor shape, 
government action to stimulate the economy seem[ed] 
to get an exemption to the general concerns about big 
government.”4 Less than three years later, the economy 
was still in dismal shape, “stimulus” had become a dirty 
word, and reducing the national public debt was the top 
policy priority for more Americans than it had been for 
15 years (around 17 percent).
5
 Former IMF Chief 
Economist Ken Rogoff noted that although “no one was 
talking about debt a year ago,” a sudden conflict over 
the debt had swept America into the “debt crisis” 
enveloping the Western world. Ultimately, this political 
battle damaged international perceptions of the 
American system (one prominent European investor 
called it “an end of empire moment”) and provoked the 
nation’s first credit downgrade as Congressional 
approval ratings fell to historic lows.
6
 Although 
Republicans appealed to the concurrent crisis emerging 
in Europe as evidence that nothing but immediate and 
extensive cutbacks in government spending could avert 
a looming debt crisis of our own, the credit downgrade 
that followed was not attributed to systemic risk but to 
uncertainty caused by the state of domestic politics and 
political discourse; the apathy of bond markets reflected 
this.  
The politicization of the debt ceiling was a 
product of the changing way in which citizens and 
policy-makers think about and experience politics. 
Whereas the European debt crisis arose out of 
unsustainable levels of debt, slow growth, and 
skyrocketing bond yields, as Chief Market Strategist at 
Russell Investments Steve Wood explained, “the US 
downgrade [was] about long-term political will, 
whereas in Europe there [were] immediate risks.”7 
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The fight over the White House in 2012 will 
focus on “conviction politics.” 
Source: whitehouse.gov 
Leading up to the conflict, conservative activists 
manipulated the political space in which the leadership 
of both parties (and the executive branch) were 
operating, using the crisis in Europe to bring debt to the 
forefront of the national discussion and recasting a raise 
in the debt ceiling as an abuse of power rather than a 
routine requirement of governance in the United 
States.
8
 This shift in the subject of American discourse 
brought on by the forces of independent conviction 
organizations had a profound impact on the agenda and 
strategies of both parties. The activist offensive had two 
distinct stages: one communicative (intended to shape 
the public’s beliefs about their interests) and one 
coordinative (aimed at policy-makers).
9
 
Convictions 
The “emergence of ‘conviction politics,’ 
especially on the political right” became an “element of 
political life” in the 1970s and 1980s in response to 
economic shock and growing concerns over the fate of 
democratic economies in a globalized world.
10
 During 
this period, neo-liberal “beliefs at the elite level” 
animated political life in the developed democracies 
and “successfully permeated mass thinking about 
government.”11 These widely held ideas characterize 
government as an institution inherently inefficient, 
ineffective, and inferior to the functioning of 
institutions in the private sector, and politicians as 
irreducibly self-interested and rational.
12
 Without 
government retrenchment to prevent capital flight and 
crowding out of more effective private sector efforts, 
slowing growth, ballooning deficits, and economic 
decline are inevitable.
13
 Following these discourses, 
there has been an astonishing deterioration of public 
confidence in public sector performance throughout 
world’s industrialized democracies, a trend “most 
pronounced” in the US.14 The growing attitude of 
hostility felt by US citizens toward their government 
has been frequently documented. In 1958, an 
overwhelming 73 percent of American respondents to 
the National Election Study “trusted the government to 
do what is right just about always or most of the time.” 
Currently, that number stands at a meager 22 percent, 
with only 3 percent of the public saying that the 
government will do what is right “just about always.” 
According to Pew Research Center, “by almost every 
conceivable measure Americans are less positive and 
more critical of government.”15  
While these neo-liberal ideas and the activists 
who promote them have been powerful in global 
politics for decades, they have enjoyed a renewed 
relevance in response to the new global economic 
crisis. According to the 2011 Pew typology: 
The most visible shift in the political landscape 
since Pew Research’s previous political typology in 
early 2005 is the emergence of a single bloc of across-
the-board conservatives. The long-standing divide 
between economic, pro-business conservatives and 
social conservatives has blurred.16 
Along with the rest of the democratic world, 
the American public has been moving toward a neo-
liberal consensus for some time. However, the success 
of Barack Obama as a presidential candidate was a 
testament to how receptive the public was to ideas 
radically inconsistent with the entrenched neo-liberal 
perspective. Not only did Obama rally liberals and 
minorities through an appeal to citizens’ “hope” for 
better government, but he successfully drew a 
significant number of independents and moderate 
Republicans to his camp as well. Following the 
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Democrats’ sweep in 2008, conservative activists 
launched an “intensive deployment of... rhetorics” 
characterizing Obama’s policy responses to the crisis as 
harmful.
17
 This assault had a real impact on public 
perceptions, particularly independents dissatisfied with 
the pace of recovery. Although heavy losses are in 
accordance with the general trends expected for 
American election cycles, the reaction against the 
president and his party in 2010 was distinctly atypical 
in its enthusiasm, tone, and content.
18 
The simple economic arguments associated 
with conviction politics furnished activists and their 
candidates with a convincing communicative discourse 
and a clear critique of liberal solutions which could be 
effectively marketed to the public. By 2011, the four 
voting blocs that support Republican candidates held as 
a “key belief” that “government is almost always 
wasteful and inefficient.”19 While this belief spread to 
55 percent of the total US population (evidencing 
encroachment of neo-liberal arguments into Democratic 
voters), 73 percent of disaffecteds, 82 percent of 
libertarians, 72 percent of “Main Street” Republicans, 
and an astonishing 90 percent of staunch conservatives 
said that this is the case. While voices coming from the 
Democratic side were frequently divided, conservatives 
ranging from the business elite to Evangelical 
Christians were all making similar arguments, which 
served to bolster the perceived credibility of their 
ideas.
20 
After the January 2010 Citizens United vs FEC 
Supreme Court decision, which overturned provisions 
of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that 
restricted the spending ability of corporations and 
unions for being in violation of the First Amendment, 
hundreds of millions of dollars in independent 
expenditures began flowing into the hands of 
conservative advocacy networks (almost double the 
independent expenditures spent on Democrats).
21
 
Independent of the party establishment, these networks 
of activists were motivated by conviction and were 
willing to risk legislative power before compromising 
on their positions. Organizations ranging from 
grassroots elements of the Tea Party and political 
entrepreneurs such as Grover Norquist to quasi-
grassroots movements funded by the Koch brothers 
joined in a communicative initiative to adapt popular 
but vaguely-held neo-liberal sentiments to the 
American economic situation (by linking debt, 
spending, and taxes to high unemployment and slow 
growth). Additionally, there was a coordinative effort to 
force the Republican Party away from the political 
center by relentlessly policing the ideological purity of 
its candidates by using implicit and explicit threats of 
primary challenges. Seeing the success of Republican 
candidates, the money behind them, and the popularity 
of their ideas, an element in the Republican leadership 
worked to incorporate the push for ideological purity 
into the party’s electoral strategy.22 
Consequences for American Public Policy 
In 2010, the confluence of unrestricted money 
pouring into conviction-oriented campaigns, and public 
anxiety about the slow pace of the economic recovery 
turned independents against the president and the 
candidates associated with him.
23
 In advance of the 
2010 elections, the Republican Party began to tailor its 
strategy to court these conviction groups by recruiting 
candidates affiliated with the Tea Party.
24
 While this 
strategy brought a wave of Republicans (especially 
those affiliated with conviction movements) back into 
government, there were signs of the unexpected 
consequences from the very beginning: the new funding 
gave these networks significant influence over the 
Republican Party’s choice of nominees as conviction 
groups repeatedly proved their willingness to fight for 
more consistent but less electable candidates. The 
consequences of these changes would be exposed in the 
fight over the nation’s debt ceiling. 
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From the very beginning, Republican leaders 
in the House of Representatives were determined to use 
the nation’s borrowing limit as leverage to demand 
heavy spending cuts from the Democrats.
25
 The GOP 
leadership pushed the argument that the debt ceiling 
should only be raised in exchange for a revenue-neutral 
reduction in the federal deficit. Although Republican 
 leaders in both the House and Senate frequently 
assured businesses and markets that they understood the 
gravity of the situation, there was a significant number 
of House Republicans who had no interest in preserving 
America’s ability to borrow money and pay its debts.26 
While Republicans’ denial about the looming 
possibility of default may have been useful in 
negotiations, the public came to see Republicans in 
Congress as quixotic and irresponsible.  
The conviction discourse espoused by 
advocacy groups and the Republican establishment had 
Speaking of… 
With the growing power of moneyed advocacy groups, ideological policing quickly became a part of 
Republican political culture, and outside groups made it clear that the debt ceiling was an issue they would fight. 
Influential commentator Sarah Palin famously reminded GOP freshmen elected with Tea Party support that for 
those thinking of supporting a compromise reached between Boehner and Obama that “everyone I talk to still 
believes in contested primaries.” The President and CEO of FreedomWorks Matt Kibbe used the confrontation to 
request an “outpouring of donations ... to sound the alarms and expand our mobilization efforts to ensure 
Congress doesn’t cave into the Boehner Plan,” calling the fight “SO critical” and adding “RINO’s beware: There 
will be serious consequences at the ballot box for Republicans blinking on this issue.” On July 27, a press release 
from the group called Boehner’s proposal to create a “supercommittee” to work out a deal over the debt a “tax 
hike in disguise.” Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS spent $20 million on television ads in the months leading up to 
the August 2 deadline preaching the danger posed by the national debt while equally emphasizing the destruction 
which would result from tax increases.  
Activist organizations began pressing their coordinative discourse on Congress months before the first 
vote on raising the debt ceiling had taken place. In May, Tea Party activists held an event (including activists 
dressed as George Washington and the Chairman of Freedom Jamboree dressed as Paul Revere) at the National 
Press Club urging Republicans to stand firm against a raise in the debt ceiling and targeting Speaker Boehner the 
day of his address to the New York Economic Club. The groups participating also announced the beginning of 
“RINO hunting season,” referring to “Republicans in name only.”  
This coordination was sustained right up to the August deadline. On July 27, Tea Party Express held a 
rally visible from the Capital building and the Club for Growth (another notorious primary challenger) reiterated 
its opposition to any deal. Citizens United announced just days before the final vote that they would be pouring 
money into the reelection campaign of Representative Jim Jordan—facing the possibility of punishment from the 
GOP after his boisterous confrontation with the Speaker—in order to “remind Speaker Boehner and the rest of 
the Republican establishment that the ‘Cup, Cap, Balance Act’ is both good politics and good policy.”  
These powerful groups were joined in their opposition to a Boehner deal by many influential 
Republicans: on August 1, Senator and Tea Party Caucus member Jim DeMint expressed his anger over the 
impending deal to raise the debt ceiling by reneging his promise to stop financing primary challenges with his 
Senate Conservative Fund; they were also joined in opposition to a deal by every Republican candidate running 
for thepPresidential nomination except Jon Huntsman. 
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clearly been effective in convincing the public that 
immediate retrenchment was absolutely necessary if a 
crisis similar to the one escalating in Europe was to be 
avoided, but it had failed to convince many voters that 
raising revenue would be a death-knell to the fragile 
recovery. By July, numerous polls suggested that the 
public was ready for a compromise which included a 
revenue-raising component. Early in the month, a 
Gallup Poll estimated that only 20 percent of 
Americans, 23 percent of independents, and 26 percent 
of Republicans wanted to bring down the deficit “only 
with spending cuts,” with 68 percent of Republicans 
willing to accept “at least some” tax increases.27 A 
Washington Post poll conducted July 14 to 17 found 54 
percent of Republicans in favor of raising taxes on 
incomes over $250 thousand and 55 percent favored 
increases in taxes on oil and gas companies (proposed 
by Democrats).
28
 In a sample conducted by University 
of Maryland’s Program for Public Consultation asking 
citizens to make specific decisions about deficit 
reduction, on average, Republicans opted to increase 
revenues more than cut spending (an average of $230 
billion to $101, respectively).
29
  
After a barrage of warnings from international 
and domestic business, policy, academic, and policy 
experts, popular opposition to raising the debt ceiling 
dissipated with the new awareness of the dangers of 
default. From late May to early June, Pew found a 
consistent number of respondents who were more 
fearful of raising the debt ceiling than failing to do so 
(Republicans actually increased to 66 percent),
30
 but by 
late July public sentiments had changed dramatically. A 
Wall Street Journal/NBC poll found only 18 percent of 
Americans remained skeptical that failure to raise the 
ceiling would cause real and serious problems with 55 
percent saying that it would. At the same time, a 
Washington Post/ABC poll found that 64 percent of 
those who strongly supported the Tea Party believed 
that the economy would be damaged, and 58 percent of 
Republican voters saw Republicans in Congress as too 
resistant to reaching a deal.
31
 With 65 percent of 
independents favoring deficit reduction through a mix 
of spending cuts and tax hikes, Republicans in 
Congress were not basing their “theological” strategy 
on public opinion.
32 
Despite last-minute efforts of the GOP 
leadership (including Tea Party hero Paul Ryan) to 
impress the potential for disastrous consequences of 
default upon their rank-and-file, members affiliated 
with the Tea Party refused to compromise. Former GOP 
presidential candidate Rudy Giuliani suggested that 
President Obama was asking these representatives to 
“commit suicide” and explained that freshmen 
Republicans were unwilling to break the “solemn 
promise” against raising taxes that had gotten them 
elected.
33
 However, the fear of “serious consequences 
at the ballot box for Republicans blinking on [the] 
issue” was not coming from senior leadership or polling 
data but from numerous threats of primary challenges.
34 
In the end, hopes for a “grand bargain” were 
unceremoniously dashed. Weeks of negotiations and 
arm-twisting could not marshal sufficient Republican 
support for any plan which raised additional revenue. 
Instead, the debt ceiling was raised with minor cuts in 
government spending and no new revenue while a 
Congressional “supercommittee” was tasked with 
reaching a suitable compromise. Across the board 
spending cuts (“sequestration”) undesirable for both 
parties were established as part of a “trigger” to ensure 
that this committee fulfilled its responsibilities. As 
promised, this display of “governance and 
policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and 
less predictable” lead Standard & Poor’s Credit Rating 
Agency to downgrade America’s credit rating from 
AAA to AA+.
35
  
What this means for 2012 
Speaking on the origins of polarization 
between America’s parties, former Republican Speaker 
of the House Dennis Hastert observed that “the far 
wings” have become the people with “the money that 
help people get elected.”36 The “incredible amounts of 
money” now available to third party groups has allowed 
these new influences unprecedented power in shaping 
the political discourse. Not only has this introduced 
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new players, but it has also marked an encroachment 
onto the traditional preserve of parties, leading John 
McCain to warn that independent expenditures are 
“making parties irrelevant.”37 This is coming at a 
particularly bad time for the Republican Party. In the 
previous elections, independents have played a 
determinate role in elections, and this is not expected to 
change in the foreseeable future.
38
 In January, a Gallup 
poll found that a record 40 percent of Americans 
identified as Independents, more than identified as 
Democrats (31 percent) or Republicans (27 percent). 
Mitt Romney’s top adviser Eric Fehrnstrom drew 
attention to this problem in his notorious statement that 
once Romney received the nomination the campaign 
would “hit a reset button” and “start all over again” 
(“like an Etch a Sketch”) with a new discourse to 
appeal to moderates and independents.
39 
The battle for the GOP presidential nomination 
has already shown that conviction groups have not 
changed their priorities. In the presidential arena, 
massive individual donors have emerged intent on 
propping up individual candidates using Super-PAC 
donations, frequently dwarfing the amounts of money 
spent by the candidates themselves and doing so with 
no regard to the projections about the candidate’s 
performance in the general election.
40
 There is 
considerable evidence that the vicious and extended 
fight over the Republican presidential nomination has 
eroded support for Republican candidates among 
Republican voters as well as Independents, while the 
heightened rhetoric has served to excite the Democratic 
base and improve public opinion about the Democratic 
Party (in March 2012, the Democratic Party was 
viewed favorably by 49 percent of poll respondents 
compared to the GOP’s 36 percent).41 President Obama 
is now the only presidential candidate at the 50 percent 
approval level, and among independent voters in the 
last four months there has been a 19 percent swing in 
Obama’s favor in a matchup with front-runner Mitt 
Romney. As Romney has worked tirelessly to promote 
himself as a “severe conservative,” since January his 
unfavorable rating among independents has jumped 9 
points, while 2012 has seen President Obama’s job 
approval rating steadily climbing.
42
 From November 
2011 through March 2012, Obama’s favorability rating 
has increased substantially while that of the Republican 
candidates has fallen, and an increasing amount of 
Republicans polled are saying that the primary is “bad 
for the party.”43 In the last six months, polls have also 
seen Republican and Tea Party excitement steadily drop 
while Democrats get more anxious to make their voices 
heard in November.
44
  
In the 2012 elections, these forces will 
continue to operate in defense of their principled 
objectives (with more experience and funding) but with 
less regard to popular sentiments than the Republican 
establishment might hope. Unless they are willing to 
fight against these groups, the GOP will have to 
consider the sentiments of moneyed activist networks, 
and Republican candidates beholden to conviction 
networks (whether by force of conviction or 
contributions) will be forced at times to take unpopular 
stances making them more well-financed but less 
electable. This, in conjunction with the unprecedented 
unpopularity which conviction-based partisan gridlock 
has earned Congress,
45
 may result in unusually high 
turnover rates for some of the candidates who were 
swept in on the wave of support for the Tea Party seen 
in 2010. The unrestricted amounts of money from 
individuals and now corporations suggest these 
conviction groups will continue to be a formidable 
force in American politics.  
Although in recent elections Republican 
candidates have enjoyed access to a new source of 
funding, the growing influence of outside groups on 
American politics may end up harming the Republican 
Party and its candidates more than helping them. So far, 
the GOP has seen its ability to impose compromises on 
its members reduced, as new sources of funding and 
primary threats create a disincentive to cooperation. 
The inability of campaigns to coordinate with 
conviction groups has also been problematic. Parallel 
campaigns have inundated districts with telephone 
calls, causing redundancies and aggravating voters, and 
PAC donors and representatives often speak on behalf 
of the candidates they support, making official 
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campaigns appear responsible for content and 
statements they did not approve.
46
 In the long-term, 
these changes in the system will force corresponding 
changes in partisan strategies. Unless Democrats 
become subject to similar pressures, they will be in a 
position to choose whether to aim their discourse at 
capturing moderates and independents or retreating to 
their ideological base. Regardless of the impact on 
Democrats, these influences will continue to act on the 
Republican Party for the foreseeable future, forcing 
party members to defend the priorities of the far right 
wings, and promising more gridlock and growing 
public dissatisfaction with Congress as an institution.  
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